Vol.11 No.1 ---- Winter 1997

Contents


F.A. Hayek



Introduction

Hayek's Political Philosophy and His Economics
Jeffrey Friedman

Essays

Where Did Economics Go Wrong?
Equilibrium as a Flight from Reality
Peter J. Boettke

Social Justice: The Hayekian Challenge
Steven Lukes

Hayek's Attack on Social Justice
David Johnston

On the Road Again:
Hayek and the Rule of Law
Juliet Williams

Market Non-Neutrality: Systemic Biases in Spontaneous Orders
Gus diZerega

Review Essay

Was Hayek an Instrumentalist?
Ryszard Legutko







Peter J. Boettke | Where Did Economics Go Wrong?

F A. Hayek's realistic economic theory has been replaced by the formalistic use of equlibrium models that bear little resemblance to reality. These models are as serviceable to the right as to the left: they allow the economist either to condemn capitalism for failing to measure up to the model of perfect competition, or to praise capitalism as a utopia of perfect knowledge and rational expectations. Hayek, by contrast, used equilibrium to show that while capitalism is not perfect, it contains error-correcting institutions that bring it closer to perfection than is intuitively apparent.


Steven Lukes | Social Justice: The Hayekian Challenge

Hayek's argument that social justice is a mirage consists of six claims: that the very idea of social justice is meaningless, religious; self-contradictory, and ideological; that realizing any degree of social justice is unfeasible; and that aiming to do so must destroy all liberty. These claims are examined in the light of contemporary theories and debates concerning social justice in order to assess whether the argument's persuasive power is due to sound reasoning, and to what extent contemporary theories of justice meet or escape the Hayekian challenge.


David Johnston | Hayek's Attack on Social Justice

Hayek assailed the idea of social justice by arguing that any effort to realize it would tranform society into an oppressive organization, stifling liberty. Hayek's view is marred by two omissions. First, he fails to consider that the goal of social justice, like the goal of wealth generation, might be promoted by strategies of indirection that do not entail oppressive organization. Second, he underestimates the tendency of the market order itself to generate oppressive organization, and consequently sees advantages in market order that it may not possess.


Juliet Williams | On the Road Again: Hayek and the Rule of Law

In his political writings, F. A. Hayek faces a classic liberal dilemma: he opposes coercion but recognizes that sometimes the state can help to minimize it. Hayek attempts to resolve the dilemma of the limits of state power by offering a definition of the rule of law that does not depend on a controversial conception of rights. However, his effort to formalize the rule of law fails. Not only does Hayek implicitly rely on an undefended theory of rights, but his rule-of-law scheme is limited to the elaboration of general principles of good government, neglecting the need for reforms aimed directly at the political processes that result in the controversial forms of coercion he deplores.


Gus diZerega | Market Non-Neutrality: Systemic Biases in Spontaneous Orders

The market is sometimes thought to be a largely neutral means for coordinating cooperation among strangers under complex conditions because it is, as Hayek noted a "spontaneous order." But in fact the market actively shapes the kinds of values it rewards, as do other spontaneous orders. Recognizing these biases allows us to see how such orders impinge on one another and on other communities basic to human life, sometimes negatively. In this way we may come to acknowledge the inevitability of placing limits on spontaneous orders.


Ryszard Legutko | Was Hayek an Instrumentalist?

In Hayek's Social and Political Thought, Roland Kley argues that Hayek's defense of Capitalism is instrumentalist: that is, that Hayek sees market societies as efficient mechanisms that have no independent ethical justification. But in fact, Hayek does have such a standard, one that is expressed in the notion of a discipline of freedom. This standard derives from the moral anthropology of the liberal-conservative tradition.

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