Contents



Globalization



 

Globalization, Neither Evil nor Inevitable
Jeffrey Friedman

Globalization: Meaning and Measurement
Charles Wolf, Jr.

Two Faces of Globalization
Douglas A. Irwin

The Failure to Converge: Why Globalization Doesn't Cause Deregulation
Jason Sorens

The Third World and Globalization
Deepak Lal

The "Free Market" and the Asian Crisis
Garett Jones

Are Free Markets the Cause of Financial Instability?
Kevin Dowd

The Crisis of (Confidence in) Global Capitalism
Barry Eichengreen

Reply to Eichengreen
George Soros

Risk and Business Cycles: Reply to Rosser
Tyler Cowen

Risk and Austrian Business-Cycle Theory: Rejoinder to Cowen
J. Barkley Rosser, Jr.

Democracy and Voter Ignorance, Revisited: Rejoinder to Ciepley
Ilya Somin

After Democracy, Bureaucracy? Rejoinder to Ciepley
Jeffrey Friedman


Globalization, Neither Evil nor Inevitable | Jeffrey Friedman

Globalization: Meaning and Measurement | Charles Wolf, Jr.

Abstract: While there is much that is new about globalization, there is much about it that is familiar. As in the past, while globalization produces both winners and losers, aggregate gains exceed aggregate losses, and gains and losses occur within both rich and poor countries. While the rich tend to grow richer, so do the poor. Absolute measures of income inequality often increase with globalization, although they are not caused by it.

Two Faces of Globalization | Douglas A. Irwin

Abstract: Fears about economic globalization overlook the fact that the growing international division of labor can be beneficial to all participants—as may be seen in the spectacular strides that have been made recently by once-impoverished developing countries. Free trade does threaten some, but the negative effects of international trade even on developed countries such as the United States have been vastly overstated. Western workers are rich because of their high productivity, not (primarily) because of their insulation from competition. Ignorance of these facts, however, fuels support not only for specific trade barriers, but for Seattle-style activism that threatens to harm the very people it is intended to benefit.

The Failure to Converge: Why Globalization Doesn't Cause Deregulation | Jason Sorens

Abstract: Conventional wisdom holds that the rigors of fiscal competition unleashed by globalization are forcing governments to roll back welfare programs, reduce or eliminate taxes on capital, and reduce regulation on mobile assets. In Freer Markets, More Rules, Steven Vogel attacks the latter contention, arguing that regulatory reform has been more often reregulatory than deregulatory, though it is generally undertaken with an eye to increasing market competition. He also maintains that governments have acted autonomously of social interests and market pressures in formulating regulatory reform. While Vogel is mistaken to contend that there has been no net reduction of government control worldwide, his revision of the conventional wisdom requires a fresh look at how susceptible states really are to the global competition for revenue.

The Third World and Globalization | Deepak Lal

Abstract: Many in both developed and developing countries fear global economic integration. But developing-country fears of volatile capital flows are unfounded, as are developed-country fears of pauper wages due to low-cost imports. Demands for "ethical trading" are as misplaced as the fears of Third-World cultural nationalists that globalization will destroy their valued ways of life.

The "Free Market" and the Asian Crisis | Garett Jones

Abstract: The Asian financial crisis, which devastated many of the newly industrializing countries, is said to have demonstrated the inherent fragility of economies built upon laissez-faire principles. However, it appears that the major sources of disruption have come from policies that deviate from laissez faire, such as government-guaranteed bailouts and international monetary policy. That capitalist economies were afflicted by the crisis does not constitute an indictment of free markets.

Are Free Markets the Cause of Financial Instability? | Kevin Dowd

Abstract: As the critics of global financial capitalism recognize, there is excessive financial instability in today's international economy. However, this instability is due not to laissez faire, but to its absence. Comparing the current world financial system to a laissez-faire benchmark highlights the very significant differences between the two.

The Crisis of (Confidence in) Global Capitalism | Barry Eichengreen

Abstract: In The Crisis of Global Capitalism, George Soros claims that the international financial economy is inherently unstable, and that while economists have failed to recognize this because of their commitment to static equilibrium theory, politicians have failed to stabilize the global economy because of their commitment to an unquestioned faith in the complete efficiency of laissez faire. While Soros is right to argue that market participants' expectations about the future can cause instability, he is wrong to maintain that this has gone unrecognized by economists, and his notion that we live in a world of economic laissez faire is equally mistaken. Indeed, his own analysis of the Asian financial crisis points to the "moral hazard" created by expectations of government intervention, rather than to laissez faire, as the culprit.

Reply to Eichengreen | George Soros

Risk and Business Cycles: Reply to Rosser | Tyler Cowen

Abstract: Rosser's thoughtful and careful review of my book on business cycles reflects a different methodological stance than my own. I believe that economic theory and macroeconomics cannot escape using the concept of risk, even though, as Rosser points out, risk is not a simple unidimensional magnitude in many circumstances. I view the rational expectations assumption as a useful way of presenting a theory, rather than as a descriptive account of real-world expectations.

Risk and Austrian Business-Cycle Theory: Rejoinder to Cowen | J. Barkley Rosser, Jr.

Abstract: Cowen and I agree that rational-expectations theory is unrealistic and that risk is difficult to quantify. However, we continue to disagree about the riskiness of consumption as opposed to investment. Since more investment might lead to a recession if investment is relatively risky, Cowen's use of rational-expectations theory to buttress the Austrian school's claim that market economies can shift toward relatively more investment without experiencing macroeconomic disruption remains suspect.

Democracy and Voter Ignorance, Revisited: Rejoinder to Ciepley | Ilya Somin

Abstract: Democratic control of public policy is nearly impossible in the presence of extreme voter ignorance, and this ignorance is in part caused by the vast size and scope of modern government. Only a government limited in its scope can be meaningfully democratic. David Ciepley's response to my article does not seriously challenge this conclusion, and his attempts to show that limited government is inherently undemocratic fail. Ciepley's alternative vision of a "democracy" that does not require informed voters turns out not to be a defense of democracy at all, but a rationalization for any form of government that achieves a high level of leadership skill and bureaucratic efficiency.

After Democracy, Bureaucracy? Rejoinder to Ciepley | Jeffrey Friedman

Abstract: In a certain sense, voluntary communities and market relationships are relatively less coercive than democracy and bureaucracy: they offer more positive freedom. In that respect, they are more like romantic relationships or friendships than are democracies or bureaucracies. This tends to make voluntary communities and markets not only more pleasant forms of interaction, but more effective ones—contrary to Weber's confidence in the superior rationality of bureaucratic control.

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